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Abstract 
 
 
Recent theoretical and empirical work has demonstrated a clear negative link 
between macroeconomic and political uncertainty and levels of private investment 
across countries. This result raises the question what institutions might help reduce 
this uncertainty, in particular, by allowing host governments to limit their own 
possibilities to act opportunistically with respect to investors. Some have argued that 
governments might benefit from joining a multilateral investment agreement, but 
there remain doubts both about the enforceability and the desirability of such an 
accord. An alternative possibility, proposed in a seminal article by North and 
Weingast (1989), is that political institutions characterised by checks and balances 
can allow governments to credibly commit not to engage in ex post opportunism with 
respect to investors. In this paper I propose a modified version of this hypothesis and 
test it using new cross-country data on political institutions. I also use a quantile 
regression technique which allows the estimated effect of political institutions to vary 
across countries and over time. 
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11. Introduction
There has been increasing recognition in recent years that the
irreversibility of many forms of private investment creates a
credibility problem for governments.  If a firm fears that a
government will have an incentive to make ex post changes in
taxes or regulations, it may prefer to delay or cancel a proposed
project.  Both sides would be better off if a government could
somehow commit not to act opportunistically.  This finding has
major implications for developing countries, where investors may
be particularly wary of the potential for radical and unexpected
swings in economic policy.  One proposal for reducing this
uncertainty is for developing country governments to "tie their
hands" by joining a multilateral investment agreement which
would prohibit opportunistic changes in policy.  Doubts remain,
however, about both the enforceability of such an agreement and
about the extent to which it would  oblige countries to harmonize
regulatory and tax policies.
An alternative institutional mechanism to reduce uncertainty
was proposed in a seminal article by North and Weingast (1989);
political institutions characterized by checks and balances can
allow governments to credibly commit not to engage in ex post
opportunism with respect to investors.  In this paper I argue in
favor of a modified version of their hypothesis.  While one can
predict that increasing the level of checks and balances in a
country will increase policy stability, existing theory also shows
how governments without checks and balances can establish
credibility through other mechanisms.  They can do this by
2building a reputation, or more simply if investors are convinced
that a government’s objective function is such that there is little
danger of opportunism.
The principal implication of this modified argument is that
the effect of political institutions on private investment will vary
across countries and over time.  Governments in political systems
with high checks and balances will, on average, find it easier to
credibly commit, but we should also expect to see greater
variability in levels of private investment within the set of
observations where checks and balances are low.1  This reflects the
fact that some governments which lack checks and balances
nonetheless find alternative routes to credibility. Ultimately,
greater variability at low levels of checks and balances reflects the
heterogeneity among authoritarian regimes which has been much
emphasized in the literature on the politics of growth.2  Panel data
estimation methods which do not take account of this
heterogeneity will provide misleading and potentially biased
estimates (Robertson and Symons, 1992; Pesaran and Smith, 1995).
Use of quantile regression techniques allows for addressing this
issue by providing a more complete analysis of the conditional
distribution than do other estimation techniques.
A further innovation of this paper is its use of new data
designed to measure the extent of checks and balances in a
country’s political system (collected by Groff, Keefer, and Walsh,
1999 and Heinisz, 1997).  In contrast with measures of democracy,
such as the Gastil index, these two indicators are constructed

1 The variance of the conditional distribution of private investment (conditional on checks and
balances) should be higher at lower levels of checks and balances.
2 See Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson (1996) and Alesina and Perotti’s (1994) survey.
3according to a pre-specified methodology and based on objective
criteria.  The other advantage of this new data is that it allows
testing a more refined set of hypotheses.  Rather than referring to
the overall level of "democracy", the indicator I use is designed to
measure something more specific: the extent to which a country’s
political institutions are characterized by multiple veto players in
government.  This new data also allows more exact testing of
political hypotheses than does data provided by risk assessment
services such as BERI, ICRG, or the Economist Intelligence Unit.
These latter measures have been useful for establishing links
between poor protection of property rights and poor economic
performance, but because they measure policy outcomes, they
give us little sense of what real world political institutions are
associated with better protection of property rights.
My findings are consistent with the above propositions.  A
standard pooled regression suggests that the average long-run
effect of moving from a parliamentary system with one veto player
in government to one with three veto players would be a 14%
increase in private investment.  But quantile regression estimates
show that this average coefficient estimate is misleading.  At the
25th percentile of the conditional distribution (of private
investment conditional on checks and balances), the estimated
effect of an identical increase in checks and balances is nearly
twice as large (26%), while at higher percentiles of the conditional
distribution the estimated effect of an increase in checks and
balances on investment is close to zero.  I will argue that the
pattern identified supports the proposition that checks and
4balances are a sufficient but not a necessary condition to achieve
credibility.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section
2 reviews the theoretical link between political institutions,
uncertainty, and private investment.  Section 3 presents the data.
Section 4 briefly investigates whether political checks and balances
are correlated with cross-country survey data on perceived levels
of policy stability.  Sections 5 and 6 then conduct pooled
regressions and quantile regressions to examine the relationship
between political checks and balances and levels of private
investment in developing countries.  Section 7 discusses
robustness issues, and section 8 concludes.
2. Political institutions and private investment
Investment and uncertainty
Before considering how political checks and balances might
reduce uncertainty, with knock-on effects of private investment, it
is first worth reviewing the economic literature on investment and
uncertainty.  This shows that predictions about the sign of the
uncertainty-investment link depend heavily on what assumptions
go into one’s model.  If one assumes perfect competition, costless
adjustment of factors other than capital, and constant returns to
scale, then uncertainty actually raises the expected profitability of
capital and therefore should lead to higher investment.  More
recent work (by Dixit and Pindyck, 1993) shows that when one
assumes that investments are irreversible, firms can be prompted
to delay or forego investments out of the fear that the economic
5environment might change for the worse.  Irreversibility implies
that downward adjustments in capital stock are more difficult to
make than are upward adjustments.3
The cross-country empirical literature on determinants of
private investment provides support for the claim that higher
uncertainty is associated with lower levels of private investment.
While most of these studies are limited by the fact that they use
only cross-sectional data, Serven and Solimano (1993) and Serven
(1998, 1997) have estimated investment equations using panel
data, finding significant support for the claim that there is a
negative investment-uncertainty link.  Serven (1998) is the most
complete of these studies, using a data set covering 94 developing
countries over 26 years (1970-1995) and adopting sophisticated
measures for macroeconomic uncertainty (variations in inflation,
terms of trade, real exchange rates, and capital prices).
Political institutions, opportunism, and uncertainty
While existing work demonstrates that private investment is
influenced by macroeconomic uncertainty, it would also be useful
to consider how political conditions might affect perceived risks of
opportunism for investors.  As mentioned, irreversible
investments may be subject to a credibility problem whereby a
government has an incentive to change taxes or regulations ex post
with the knowledge that investors cannot easily withdraw.  For
example, the well-known time-consistency problem in capital
taxation exists even for governments which are social welfare

3 As discussed by Serven (1998), in order to demonstrate a negative link between uncertainty
and investment one needs to assume not only irreversibility but also either risk aversion,
imperfect competition, or decreasing returns to scale.
6maximizers.  A proposed solution to this problem is for voters to
strategically delegate to an elected representative who has a
greater share of her assets in the form of capital than does the
median voter in society (Persson and Tabellini 1994).
One point which further complicates the credibility problem
in investment is that firms are unlikely to have complete
information about the preferences of any individual government
decision maker.  Instead, investors will have to make decisions
based on their prior beliefs about these preferences.  Under these
conditions, the presence of political institutions characterized by
multiple veto points (multiple decision makers in government) can
help minimize credibility problems, to the extent that the greater
the number of veto points, the higher the probability that at least
one veto point will be controlled by an actor who, because of the
assets they or their supporters own, will oppose ex post
opportunistic changes in policy.  They key here is that control of a
single veto point is, by definition, sufficient to block proposed
changes in policy.  More simply, if giving political control to a
capitalist can solve the time-inconsistency problem in capital
taxation, then all other things being equal, having multiple veto
points in government increases the likelihood that at least one veto
point will be controlled by a capitalist.
A veto point can be defined as a political institution, the
holder of which has the power to block a proposed change in
policy.  Multiple veto points can be created by constitutional
provisions which specify, for example, that multiple chambers of a
legislature must approve any changes in laws.  Multiple veto
points can also exist as a consequence of electoral rules such as
7proportional representation, which favor the development of
coalition governments.  In coalition governments any one member
of the coalition may be able to veto a policy proposal by
threatening to withdraw from the government if its demands are
not satisfied.4
While the potential effect of multiple veto points on policy
stability is clear, their overall effect on private investment is more
ambiguous.  In cases where investors find current policies to be
favorable, but they fear potential future changes in policy, then
institutions which promote policy stability are obviously of
significant benefit.  On the other hand, policy stability can also
have a negative impact on private investment to the extent that it
involves governments failing to make needed changes in policies
in response to external shocks.  This is particularly important in
the area of macroeconomic policy, where a negative revenue
shock, for example, will result in a deterioration of a country’s
fiscal balance unless adjustment measures are taken, and
potentially in inflation to the extent that deficits are financed
through money creation.  Volatility of inflation creates uncertainty
for investors about the profitability of potential projects.  Fiscal
deficits can have the well-known effect of crowding-out private
investment.  In empirical tests it is possible to control for this
negative impact of checks and balances on private investment by
including right-hand side variables for inflation volatility and the
fiscal balance.

4 For a survey of political and electoral institutions, veto points, and their effect on policy
making see Tsebelis (1995).
8Alternative sources of credibility
While having multiple veto points increases the likelihood of
policy stability, governments in systems without multiple veto
points can establish credibility for their economic policies through
other means.  To the extent that a government does not discount
the future too heavily, it is well known that reputational equilibria
may be established whereby a government has an incentive not to
make opportunistic changes in policies, because doing so will
result in a sanction from investors.5  A second possibility for
establishing credibility with only one veto point is more simple.
The individual or political party which controls a single veto point
might have an objective function which gives them little incentive
to make opportunistic changes in policy (as in the case where
decisions on capital taxation are delegated to a capitalist).
The above discussion leads to two observable implications
with respect to checks and balances and private investment.  First,
checks and balances should, on average, be positively associated
with levels of private investment.  Second, we should expect to see
greater variability of levels of private investment in countries with
low levels of checks and balances.  This would reflect the fact that
for some of these countries, the absence of checks and balances
will be a handicap to the extent it limits credibility.  For others, the
absence of checks and balances will be less of a handicap, because
they will have established credibility through other means.

5 The repeated games literature has of course, shown that this reputational equilibrium is but
one of many possible outcomes.
9Relationship of this argument to the broader debate on politics,
investment, and growth
The issue of checks and balances and their impact on private
investment is closely related to the broader debate on democratic
institutions and economic performance.  In terms of theory, if
many political scientists have emphasized that democratic rights
might help promote economic growth, others have emphasized
how broadened political participation might lead to a
deterioration in economic performance.6  Empirical studies have
generally failed to provide robust evidence in favor of either a
positive or negative association of democracy with growth.7 One
possible reason for this is that democracy influences growth
through numerous different channels, and these effects may have
opposite signs.  For example, democracy might help to reduce
uncertainty and raise private investment, but it also might
generate increased pressures for redistribution, thus lowering
allocative efficiency.
Alesina and Perotti (1994) suggest another important reason
for these inconclusive findings; dictatorships are a very
heterogeneous group.  Some authoritarian governments, like that
of Singapore, have pursued policies that promoted fast growth.
Others, like Mobutu’s Zaïre, have tended towards kleptocracy.
Still others, like Suharto's Indonesia, have at first been seen as
models of stability, and subsequently, as prime examples of
authoritarian misrule.  The quantile regression techniques used in

6 See for example Huntington (1968).
7 See Barro (1996), Alesina and Perotti (1994), and Leblang (1997)
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this paper allow one to take into account this implied
heterogeneity among authoritarian governments.
In contrast to empirical studies on growth, there is a more
statistically significant link between levels of private investment
and overall levels of democracy.  Serven (1997) finds that the
Gastil index of civil liberties is significantly correlated with private
investment in a panel data estimation which controls for other
investment determinants.  One reason for this result may be that
focusing on private investment as dependent variable excludes
some of the negative effects which democracy might have on
economic performance via increased demands for redistribution.8
As Serven himself notes, however, it is unclear exactly what
phenomenon the Gastil indices are capturing.9  This suggests a
need for improved measures of political institutions.  Second, even
if civil liberties and private investment are significantly correlated
in Serven’s study, it remains possible that the effect of civil liberties
varies substantially from country to country within his sample.
Ideally, one would want to know if this parameter heterogeneity
reflects heterogeneity among dictatorships.
In addition to the finding that measures of democracy are
correlated with levels of private investment, several cross-sectional
studies have identified a link between private investment and the

8 Focusing on private investment rather than overall investment is also preferable when
considering the effect of uncertainty, because Aizenman and Marion (1996) have shown that
in cases where high uncertainty leads to a decline in private investment, public investment
often increases in compensation.
9 In terms of measurement, since the Gastil index is subjective, and no methodology is publicly
provided for its assessment, the index may actually be measuring the overall institutional
environment in a country, rather than just political or civil rights.  There may also be an
endogeneity bias if assessors are influenced by recent economic performance in deciding to
what extent political and civil liberties have been present.  The Polity III database’s measure of
democracy is also significantly correlated with levels of private investment.  While, unlike the
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measures of institutional uncertainty developed by risk
assessment agencies.  Brunetti and Weder (1998) and Poirson
(1998) both find that indices of the rule of law, bureaucratic
quality, and corruption are significantly correlated with levels of
private investment, controlling for other determinants.  These
findings have made a significant contribution to the literature, but
they have two shortcomings.  First, indices such as the "rule of
law" do not give any indication of which actual government
institutions are associated with better provision of the rule of law.
Second, like the Polity III and Gastil indices, measures of
institutional quality may be subject to an endogeneity bias
whereby their designers are influenced by overall economic
performance in judging to what extent the rule of law, for
example, is present.  The political measures in this paper capture
differences in actual political institutions while avoiding
endogeneity bias by using objective formulae.
3. Data issues
The private investment dataset I use is an updated version of
the developing country dataset from Serven (1998).  It calculates
annual levels of new private investment as the residual obtained
after subtracting public sector investment from total investment.
While the number of countries included is large, the dataset is
unbalanced, with private investment figures for several countries
only being available from the late 1980s.10  The summary statistics

Gastil indices, the methodology for calculating the Polity III democracy index is made public,
it remains subjective in its construction.
10 Data on private investment, checks and balances, and other determinants of investment is
available for 79 countries covering the period 1970-1994.  A complete series of investment data
is available for 48 of the 79 countries.
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in Table I, below, present information on constant-price private
investment as a ratio of GDP.
In order to control for determinants of private investment
which are not related to political uncertainty, I follow existing
studies by including several macroeconomic variables.11  The
annual growth rate of real GDP is included to capture the
conventional accelerator effect of growth on investment.  The
standard deviation of the inflation rate is included, because
variability of inflation creates uncertainty about the profitability of
investment projects.12  The level of private sector credit (as a share
of GDP) should also be a determinant of private investment, and
probably a more important one than the real interest rate, since
many of the countries in the sample utilized direct instruments of
monetary policy during the period considered.  A dummy variable
is also included for countries for which petroleum exports
represent more than 50% of total exports, based on the logic that
these countries may have higher levels of private investment due
to higher foreign direct investment.
Other variables, such as the relative price of capital goods,
and the overall fiscal balance (after grants) should also logically be
included as economic determinants of investment, but due to data
limitations, inclusion of these two variables would significantly
reduce overall sample size (by 30% and 25% respectively).13  This

11 When not otherwise specified, the source for all data is the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators.
12 This is measured as the standard deviation of a country’s inflation rate over the previous
seven years.
13 The investment price ratio is measured as the ratio between the fixed investment deflator
and the GDP deflator (as in Serven 1998).
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would introduce a bias to the extent that the process for excluding
observations was not a random one.  As an alternative approach, I
have chosen to use a procedure to impute missing values of these
two variables.  Results of investment regressions using these
partially imputed variables are then presented .  They are fully
consistent with the results of regressions which did not include the
imputed variables.14
The principal goal of this paper is to examine the link
between political institutions and private investment, and to do so
I make use of two newly developed measures of political checks
and balances.  Heinisz (1997)  has developed a formula for
measuring the institutional constraints placed on a country’s
executive based on (1) the number of formal constitutional veto
points in a political system (executive, number of houses of the
legislature, federal sub-units, and judiciary), (2) whether these veto
points are controlled by different parties, and (3) the cohesiveness
of the majority which controls each veto point.  The justification
for this last criterion is the claim that an executive facing a
legislature controlled by a coalition of opposition parties will be
less constrained than one who faces a legislature where a single
opposition party is in control.15  In contrast, if a legislative majority
is politically aligned with the executive, then the executive will be
more constrained in his/her actions when this majority is a
coalition of several different parties as opposed to a single party.
As a proxy for the cohesiveness of legislative majorities, Heinisz

14 The procedure used was to generate imputed values by a routine in STATA which uses
best-subset regression to estimate missing values based on the correlation between other
regressors.
15 Note, this method of measurement implies that the Heinisz index is an imperfect proxy for
the number of veto players in a political system.  The reason is that it is designed to measure
constraints on the executive, while it ignores to what extent the legislature is also constrained.
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adjusts his index according to levels of party fractionalization.  The
Heinisz data is available for the years 1971-1994.  I have created a
modified version of Heinisz’s index (called political constraints
here) which excludes data regarding federal sub-units (which may
not have veto power over the policy decisions which matter to
investors) and the judiciary.16
The second measure of checks and balances I use is the one
developed by Groff, Keefer, and Walsh (1999) which is available
for the years 1975-1994.  Their key innovation is to provide direct
evidence on the number of parties within legislative majorities,
rather than inferring this from fractionalization data, as in Heinisz
(1997).  Their index is based on a formula which counts the
number of veto players, based on whether the executive and
legislative chamber(s) are controlled by different parties in
presidential systems, and on the number of parties in government
for parliamentary systems.  The index is then modified to take
account of the fact that certain electoral rules will affect the
cohesiveness of governing coalitions.  Greater internal party
cohesion in closed list systems will be synonymous with a lower
level of checks and balances.  The index is also adjusted
downwards for countries where there are significant restrictions
on electoral competition.17  A full description of the calculation of
this index is presented in Annex II.  Since the probability that at
least one actor will prefer the status quo is likely to be a non-

16 I have excluded the judiciary, because no accurate cross-country data is available to
determine when and where the judiciary acts as a veto player with respect to policies which
matter for investors.  Heinisz (1997) uses data from risk assessment agencies to judge whether
the judiciary is an independent veto player, but as noted above, risk assessment agency data
has several significant shortcomings.  For a full description of the formula used to calculate
Heinisz’s index see Heinisz (1997).
17 When political competition is heavily restricted it seems less likely that veto players with
heterogeneous preferences will hold office.
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monotonic function of the number of veto players, a log version of
the Groff, Keefer, Walsh index is used in this paper.18
A final group of regression variables is designed to capture
the effect of political instability on investment.  In contrast with
cross-sectional analyses which average these variables over time,
use of time-series cross-section data here allows for more precise
testing of the extent to which change in a country’s political
system is associated with lower levels of private investment.  Non-
constitutional transfers of executive power (coups) are particularly
likely to increase uncertainty.19  One reason for this is that, as
Londregan and Poole (1990) have shown, experiencing one coup
tends to increase the probability that a country will suffer
subsequent coups.  When it is feared that an extra-constitutional
transfer of power might take place, the number of formal veto
points in a political system becomes increasingly irrelevant.
While constitutional transfers of political power are likely to
generate less turmoil than will coups d’état, they still may be
associated with increased uncertainty about the future course of
government policies to the extent that election winners are not
known beforehand and to the extent that the preferences of future
election winners are not well known.  I have included two
separate variables to capture this effect, both of which are based
on data collected by Heinisz (1997).  Constitutional changes in the
executive are measured by the zero-one dummy: executive.
Constitutional change in the legislature are measured by the

18 Otherwise this index would give as much weight to a change from 1 to 2 veto players are
from 4 to 5, for example.
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variable legislative instability, a continuous variable that measure
the extent of legislature turnover in a given year.20
Table I: Summary Statistics
# obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
Private investment% GDP 1611 11.6 6.7 0.14 44.9
Laggedinvestment %GDP 1611 11.6 6.7 0.14 44.0
GDP growth % 1611 0.01 0.06 -0.48 0.27
Private credit %GDP 1611 24.9 17.8 0.11 128.4
Inflation (stdev) 1605 0.70 4.54 0.001 53.4
Coups 1611 0.07 0.26 0 1
Legislative turnover 1611 0.04 0.16 0 2.24
Executive turnover 1611 0.11 0.31 0 1
Checks 1382 2.39 1.33 1 8
Checks (log) 1382 0.72 0.55 0 2.08
Political constraints 1611 0.15 0.18 0 0.66
Democracy (Polity III) 1611 3.2 3.7 0 10
Fiscal balance %GDP 1138 -0.04 0.06 -0.66 0.18
Investment price ratio 1220 0.97 0.25 0 2.59
4. A cross-sectional investigation of political institutions and
uncertainty
The two main theoretical claims of this paper are that
political checks and balances should be associated with higher
levels of private investment, and that the lower the level of checks
and balances, the greater the variability in levels of private

19 This variable is based on data collected in Heinisz (1997).
20 The formula for calculating this variable is (|S2-S1|)/2 where S1 is a party’s share of seats
in the legislature in the previous year and S2 is a party’s share of seats in the legislature during
the current year.
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investment across countries.  The reason for this link between
checks and balances and private investment involves the potential
for the former to reduce uncertainty.  Before investigating the
effects of checks and balances on private investment, it seems
useful to consider the more direct question of whether political
institutions actually do reduce policy uncertainty.  If this can be
demonstrated, it would support the claim that the effect of checks
and balances on private investment occurs via uncertainty, and
not for some other reason.
Data on perceived levels of policy uncertainty across
countries have recently been collected in a firm-level survey
financed by the World Bank.  Among the questions posed,
businesses were asked whether they feared that unanticipated
changes in government policy would jeopardize the future
profitability of their investments.21  Brunetti and Weder (1998)
have already found, based on indicators from this survey, that
perceived policy uncertainty is negatively correlated with levels of
private investment.  A further question is whether these indicators
of uncertainty are themselves endogenous to the structure of a
country’s formal political institutions.
Figure I, below, plots country averages for perceived policy
uncertainty against levels of checks and balances, based on the
political constraints measure developed by Heinisz (1997).22  There
is a clear positive relationship between the two variables.  Results
of a simple bivariate regression show that this relationship is

21 The exact question was "Do you regularly have to cope with unexpected changes in rules,
laws, or policies which materially affect your business?".  See World Bank, World Development
Report 1997.
22 The country averages represent the average response by firms in a given country.
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statistically significant.23  Interestingly, the figure also seems to
show that some countries have attained low levels of policy
uncertainty despite having low levels of checks and balances.  This
supports the above proposition that checks and balances are not a
necessary condition for credible commitment.
These cross-sectional results are consistent with the
propositions laid out above.  However, the robustness of this
result is obviously limited by the fact that only cross-sectional data
are available for perceived uncertainty.  The above analysis also
does not include any control variables.  The next section addresses
both of these issues in its consideration of the link between
political institutions and private investment.

Figure I: political institutions and policy stability
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
23 The variable for policy stability is measured on a scale from 1 (low stability) to 7 (high
stability).  Regression results: Estimated perceived policy stability = 2.96 (0.08) + 1.27 (0.31)
Political constraints.  White’s heteroskedastici consistent standard errors in parentheses. N=60.
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5. Pooled investment regressions
Table II, below, presents results of several pooled investment
regressions with checks and political constraints used as alternative
measures of checks and balances.  Regressions 1 and 2 were
estimated using OLS without controlling for country-specific or
year-specific effects.  The coefficients on checks and political
constraints are positive and significant at the 10% level and the 1%
level respectively.  It would be unwise to draw inferences from
these estimates, though, because results of a standard likelihood
ratio test show that groupwise heteroskedasticity is present.24
While the use of White’s standard errors can provide consistent
standard error estimates, OLS may still be inefficient in the
presence of groupwise heteroskedasticity.
Regressions 3 and 4 present GLS estimates which correct for
groupwise heteroskedasticity by giving greater weight to
countries where the variance of the residuals is lower.  The
procedure was iterated to obtain maximum likelihood estimates.25
Both short and long-run coefficients of checks and political
constraints in these regressions are significant at the 1% level.  In
terms of substantive significance, based on regression 3 a move
from a purely authoritarian system (checks=1) to one with two veto
players (checks=2) would be associated with a 2% short-run
increase in investment and a 19% long-run increase in investment.
Likewise, a shift from a parliamentary system with a single-party
majority to one with a three-party coalition would result in a

24 In both cases the null of homoscedasticity across groups was rejected at the p<.001 level.
The test used was that presented in Greene (2000) p.511.
25 Results of two-step estimates of this procedure were nearly identical to the ML estimates.
The method used was that first proposed by Harvey and presented in detail in Greene 2000,
pp.514-522.
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short-run increase of 1% and a long-run increase of 14%.26  Finally,
results of regressions estimated using imputed values for the fiscal
balance and an investment price ratio were fully consistent with
the displayed results for regressions 3 and 4.27
Results for regressions 3 and 4 also show that coefficients on
the economic determinants of investment such as GDP growth and
private sector credit have the expected sign and the coefficients on
GDP growth are highly significant.  Results with regard to the
political instability variables are less conclusive.  While the
coefficient for extra-constitutional changes in government (coup)
has the expected negative sign, it is not statistically significant, and
the coefficients for constitutional changes and parliamentary
turnover are actually positive in both regressions.
Alternative specifications, unobserved country effects and
heterogeneous parameters
While the above results suggest that high checks and
balances are, on average, associated with high levels of private
investment, they are subject to three potential shortcomings: (1)
failure to control for other components of democracy (2) failure to
control for additional unobserved country effects, and (3)
heterogeneous regression parameters.  This sub-section considers
each issue in turn.
Checks and balances are not synonymous with democracy
(witness countries like the UK which are democratic but have

26 Substantive results from regression 4 are similar to those from regression 3.  They are not
directly comparable, however, because the political constraints variable is calculated based on
the level of fractionalization within each legislative chamber rather than on the number of
coalition partners.
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political institutions with few veto points).  But checks and
balances in general are likely to be highly correlated with other
characteristics of democracy, such as human rights, which may
themselves have a positive effect on levels of private investment.
It is difficult to control for these other characteristics, because
panel data measures of other sub-components of democracy are
not generally available.
Given this limitation, an alternative route is to include a
more general measure of democracy, such as the Polity III
democracy index (democracy), as a control in the Table II
regressions (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1998)  When regressions 3
and 4 were re-estimated including this variable, the checks and
balances measures remained significant while the indicator for
democracy was not significant.28  This result may be influenced by
multicollinearity between the checks and balances measures and
democracy, however, so I also conducted a non-nested test
comparing the explanatory power of a model including checks
and balances (but not democracy)  and a model including democracy
(but not checks).29  This followed the J-test methodology for non-
nested tests proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981).  These
test results were consistent with the earlier regressions in favoring
the checks and balances specification.30

27 Coefficients and standard errors for checks and political constraints were .030 (.009) and .077
(.023), respectively.
28 Coefficients and standard errors for checks and political constraints were .024 (.010) and .072
(.025), respectively.  Coefficients and standard errors for democracy were .0009 (.001) and
.0003 (.001).
29 The simple correlation between democracy and political constraints is 0.63.  The simple
correlation between democracy and checks is 0.49.
30 These tests involved estimating the two alternative specifications and then re-estimating
each specification while including the fitted values from the alternative model as a parameter.
The t-statistic on the fitted values can be interpreted as a test of the null that the alternative
specification would not add explanatory power to the existing model.  In the case of the
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In addition to failing to control for other components of
democracy, the results from regressions 3 and 4 may also be
biased by not controlling for country-specific effects and year-
specific effects.  Standard F-tests show that while a set of annual
dummies when added to each of these was not jointly significant,
a set of country dummies was jointly significant.31
While controlling for unobserved country effects by
including a set of country dummies might distinguish the effect of
checks and political constraints from other variables, this method
also has the obvious disadvantage of sweeping away all cross-
country variation in the data.  This is particularly problematic
given the pattern of variation of the checks and balances variables.
While the institutional measure, checks, does vary over time, there
are thirteen countries in the sample for which the variable remains
constant. In each case these are purely authoritarian systems
where checks=1.  Likewise, there are 19 countries where the level of
political constraints remains constant at 0.  In estimating the
coefficients for checks and for political constraints a fixed effects
model would, in effect, ignore these countries.  Even  in those
countries where levels of checks and political constraints have varied
over time, changes have generally occurred with low frequency.  A
number of authors have recently suggested that precisely for these
reasons, cross-country studies using fixed effects methods are
inappropriate for establishing inferences from such data (Temple
1999; Pritchett, 1998).  Results from regressions 5 and 6 in Table II
should be viewed with this in mind.

regression using checks and the regression using political constraints the null could not be
rejected.  In both alternative specifications using democracy the null was rejected.
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
31 P-values for the test that all country dummies were equal were P<0.01 in both cases.  For the
annual dummies p-values were .15 for regression 3 and .26 for regression 4.
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Table II: Panel Estimates of Private Investment Determinants
(1)
OLS
(2)
OLS
(3)
GLS
(4)
GLS
(5)
GLS-
LSDV
(6)
GLS-
LSDV
Checks (short-run coeff) .033
(.018)
.027
(.009)
.013
(.012)
Checks (long run coeff) .292
(.151)
.271
(.087)
.054
(.052)
Pol. Constraints(short run) .089
(.035)
.076
(.023)
.023
(.029)
Pol. Constraints (long run ) .746
(.311)
.778
(.237)
.104
(.134)
Lagged investment .888
(.021)
.881
(.019
.901
(.010)
.902
(.009)
.759
(.018)
.775
(.014)
GDP growth % .866
(.203)
.640
(.190)
1.12
(0.12)
.969
(.110)
1.12
(0.13)
.905
(.112
Private sector credit %GDP .029
(.017)
.031
(.015)
.009
(.006)
.014
(.006)
.016
(.014)
.016
(.011)
Inflation (stdev) -.002
(.003)
-.002
(.003)
-.0003
(.0017)
-.0006
(.001)
-.002
(.002)
-.002
(.002)
Coups -.057
(.037)
-.064
(.034)
-.026
(.020)
-.021
(.016)
-.052
(.018)
-.040
(.016)
Legislative turnover .059
(.031)
.040
(.026
.016
(.015)
.012
(.013)
.006
(.016)
.004
(.014
Executive turnover -.019
(.025)
-.014
(.022
-.022
(.013)
.015
(.012
-.017
(.013)
.016
(.012)
Oil .023
(.020)
.037
(.018
.006
(.012)
.021
(.012)
N= 1376 1605 1374 1605 1374 1605
R2 .82 .88
Log likelihood 172.86 194.42 239.76 267.80
OLS estimates use White’s heteroskedastic consistent standard errors.
Regressions 5 and 6 repeat the GLS estimation procedure
while including a set of country dummy variables.  The
coefficients for checks and political constraints remain positive, but
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neither the short-run nor the long-run coefficient are significant at
conventional levels.  They are both also considerably smaller in
magnitude.
In addition to potential biases due to omitted variables, the
results from regressions 3 and 4 in Table II may also be biased and
misleading to the extent they ignore parameter heterogeneity.
Results of a Wald test suggest that the null hypothesis that the
parameters for political institutions (checks and political constraints)
are constant across countries is massively rejected.32  Incorrectly
assuming parameter heterogeneity can have two major
consequences.  First, even if pooled regression gives a consistent
estimate of the mean value for a parameter across countries, if
parameter values do in fact differ greatly, then presenting an
average is misleading.  Second, in a dynamic panel data context,
Robertson and Symons (1992) and Pesaran and Smith (1995) have
shown that falsely assuming parameter homogeneity can bias
estimates due to correlation of the error term with other right hand
side variables.  This generally leads to a downward bias on short-
run coefficients and an upward bias on long-run coefficients.
Pesaran and Smith propose that when there is parameter
heterogeneity across countries, consistent estimates of parameter
averages can be estimated by taking mean values from individual
country regressions.  While this may generate consistent estimates,

32 The procedure used was a Wald test of the null that the coefficients on checks and political
constraints which resulted from individual country regressions were not significantly different
from the average coefficient estimate provided by the GLS model which corrected for
groupwise heteroscedasticity.  In the case of the test for pooling across countries, the result for
regression 3 was Chi(52)=105 P<.001.  For regresson 4 the result was Chi(52)=110.5 p<.001.
Tests of the constancy of parameters across years showed that the null could not be rejected.
Results for regression 3 were Chi(20)=26.1 p=.16 and for regression 4 Chi(24)=18.41 p=.78.  I
tested for the constancy of the political institutions parameters alone (rather than the
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drawing inferences under these conditions based on cross-country
averages may still be misleading, and since there are relatively few
observations per country in the panel used here (24 maximum),
there is likely to be a massive loss of efficiency in performing
country by country estimates.  The following section proposes that
quantile regression techniques can be used under these
circumstances to establish different parameter estimates for
different ranges of the conditional distribution.  This method
cannot fully take account of parameter heterogeneity, but it does
allow one to test for one potential source of this heterogeneity, the
fact that governments without checks and balances might find
alternative means of establishing their credibility.
6. Quantile regression estimates
Section 2’s theoretical discussion suggested that while high
checks and balances should, on average, be associated with high
levels of private investment, there should be greater variation in
levels of private investment among countries with low levels of
checks and balances.  This pattern would reflect the fact that some
of these governments might find alternative routes to credibility:
by building a reputation or simply by having the "right"
preferences.  Visual examination of the bivariate relationship
between investment and checks suggests that this may in fact be
the case (Figure II, below), but this proposition can be tested more
rigorously using quantile regression techniques.

constancy of all parameters), because of the paper’s emphasis on drawing inferences from
these variables in particular.  (Hsiao, 1986 pp.135-136).
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Quantile regression as developed by Koenker and Bassett
(1978) employs a least absolute deviation estimator which is often
used to estimate a median regression line for the conditional
distribution (rather than the mean line estimated by OLS).  This
estimation method can also be used to estimate percentiles of the
conditional distribution other than the 50th.  A test of the null
hypothesis that slope parameters at different quantiles are equal
can be used as a test for the presence of heteroskedasticity.
Quantile regression can also be used to test specific propositions
about the shape of the conditional distribution.  Most applications
of quantile regression have been in microeconomics.33  In one
example, Deaton (1996) has used quantile regression to show that
while richer households in developing countries, on average,
spend a smaller share of their income on food, it is also true that
there is higher variance in the proportion of income spent on food
among richer households.  In other words, some rich households
still spend significant shares of their income on food while others
spend very little.34
The argument I have made about the effect of checks and
balances can be tested in an analogous manner.  If the variance of
the conditional distribution of investment (conditional on checks
and balances) is greater at low levels of checks and balances, then
one should observe a pattern where, as the quantile one is
estimating rises, the slope coefficients on checks and on political

33 See Buchinsky (1994).
34 Deaton demonstrates this by showing that when income share spent on food (YS) is
regressed on overall income (Y), while the coefficient on overall income (Y) is negative in a
regression at the 10th percentile, in a regression at the 90th percentile it is actually positive.  The
fact that the estimated coefficient on Y is more positive at higher quantiles shows that there is
greater variation in the conditional distribution (YS conditional on Y) at higher levels of
overall income.
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constraints should become less positive.  This can be tested by
estimating the same specification as used in the regressions in
section 4, but at several different quantiles (such as the 25th, 50th,
and 75th).  Different coefficients are observed for each quantile and
tested against the null that they are equal to the coefficient from
the 50th percentile.
Figure 2
Figure II: private investment and checks and balances
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Table III, below, reports results for coefficients on checks and
political constraints from quantile regression estimates (complete
results for these regressions are found in annex 1).35  As can be
seen, both the short and long-run coefficients are more positive
and more significant at lower quantiles.  In substantive terms, in
the regression using checks the estimated effect at the 25th percentile
of a move from a one-party majority in a parliamentary system to

35 Following other studies using quantile regression, I have used bootstrapped standard errors.
This is necessitated by the fact that the density function for purposes of estimating the
variance-covariance matrix is unknown.  A common random number seed was used in all
regressions in order to allow replication of the results.
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a three party majority would be a 26% long run increase in
investment.   The estimated effect of a similar change at the 75th
percentile would be only 6%.  Quantile regressions using imputed
values for the fiscal balances and an investment price ratio
generated similar results.36
Results of Wald tests show that while one cannot reject the
null that the 25th percentile coefficients are equal to the 50th
percentile coefficients, one can reject the null that the 75th
percentile coefficients are equal in three out of four cases (taking
the 10% level as a cutoff).
Table IV repeats the exercise while including a set of
dummies to control for unobserved country effects.  Not
surprisingly, given the correlation of the checks and balances
measures with these country dummies, the magnitude of
coefficients for checks and political constraints is considerably
reduced, and they are no longer statistically significant at
conventional levels.  However, one still observes a pattern
whereby the coefficients are less positive the higher the quantile
estimated.  What’s more, in each of the four cases, Wald tests favor
rejecting the hypothesis that the coefficients at the 75th percentile
are equal to the coefficients at the 50th percentile.  This is powerful
evidence that the pattern in the conditional distribution observed
in the Table III regressions is not attributable to a failure to control
for country-specific effects.

36 The coefficients and standard errors for checks at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles were .039
(.016), .025 (.011), and .015 (.014).  Coefficients and standard errors for political constraints at the
25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles were .132 (.029), .098 (.024), and -.003 (.041).
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Table III: Quantile Regression Estimates of Investment
Determinants (without country dummies)
Checks Political constraints
Percentile Short run Long run Short run Long run
25th .028
(.016)
.510
(.291)
.126
(.043)
1.83
(.778)
50th .020
(.011)
.268
(.142)
.080
(.026)
1.05
(.385)
75th .014
(.015)
.110
(.114)
.019
(.041)
.155
(.306)
25th=50th P=.57 P=.19 P=.21 P=.24
75th=50th P=.59 P=.08 P=.09 P=.08
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. (100 replications)
Checks regressions, N=1374.  Political constraints regressions,
N=1611.
While the above results show that there is, in fact, greater
variance of the conditional distribution at lower levels of checks
and balances, it is not possible to prove with existing data whether
this is due to the fact that low checks and balances governments
sometimes find alternative routes to credibility.  What can be done
is to investigate whether alternative explanations seem plausible.
It is noteworthy in this regard that not all right-hand side variables
in the quantile regressions have less positive slopes at higher
quantiles (see Annex I).  This reinforces the argument that the
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reason for the observed pattern in the conditional distribution is
specific to the checks and balances variables.
Table IV: Quantile Regression Estimates of Investment
Determinants (with country dummies)
Checks Political constraints
Percentile Short run Long run Short run Long run
25th .034
(.025)
.136
(.096)
.048
(.051)
.255
(.269)
50th .027
(.023)
.113
(.101)
.044
(.045)
.192
(.209)
75th -.006
(.022)
-.021
(.076)
-.021
(.041)
-.077
(.142)
25th=50th P=.77 P=.83 P=.94 P=.81
75th=50th P=.05 P=.09 P=.07 P=.09
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. (100 replications)
Checks regressions, N=1374.  Political constraints regressions,
N=1611.
7. Robustness of the results
This final empirical section briefly examines whether the
above results may be affected by the endogeneity of the political
system to levels of investment.37  Joint endogeneity of political

37 Another potential robustness issue involves autocorrelation.  While autocorrelation is a
common problem in panel data, use of a specification that includes a lagged dependent
variable generally provides a means of reducing any serial correlation of error terms.  Results
of Lagrange multiplier tests adapted for panel data show that the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation cannot be rejected in any of the results of the pooled regressions in Table II.  These
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variables and economic performance has been a frequent concern
in growth regressions.  A priori there may be less reason to believe
that the presence of checks and balances in a country’s political
system is endogenous to levels of private investment.  The main
reason for this would be that formal political institutions are
modified only rarely.  On the other hand, one might observe a
phenomenon whereby increased growth and investment prompt
rulers to relax restrictions on political competition.  This change
would, in some countries, lead to the emergence of multiple
political parties in government.  Since the indicators of checks and
balances used in this paper take account of both the structure of
formal political institutions and the extent to which these
institutions are controlled by multiple actors, this would create an
endogeneity problem.
I considered the potential endogeneity of the checks and
balances variables in my sample by first running Granger causality
tests.   An initial variant  involved regressing each checks and
balances variable on lagged values of itself and on lagged private
investment.  Individual regressions were estimated for each
country.  In only three countries for checks and six countries for
political constraints was the coefficient on lagged investment
significant at conventional levels.  A second variant of these tests
involved regressing each checks and balances variable on its own
lag and on a variable measuring the net change in the level of
private investment over the previous four years.  The coefficient
on the change in investment variable was only significant in two
countries in the case of checks and three countries in the case of

tests were based on a variant of the Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation.  In all cases p-
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political constraints.  While the number of observations in each of
these individual country regressions was not large, this is
nonetheless fairly convincing evidence that, on average, neither
checks nor political constraints is Granger-caused by investment.
As a final test for the potential endogeneity of checks and
balances, I considered whether there might be a simultaneity bias
to the extent that checks and balances and private investment
might be jointly influenced by certain political and economic
shocks. One way to deal with this issue is to repeat regressions 3
and 4 from Table II while instrumenting for checks and political
constraints with their respective lags.  A Hausman specification test
was then used to compare the OLS and IV estimates and so test for
the consistency of the OLS estimates.  In both the case of political
constraints and checks the null of the consistency of the OLS
estimates could not be rejected.38
In sum, while there is no doubting the fact that political and
economic variables are often jointly endogenous, in the case of
political checks and balances, it appears feasible to consider them
as being exogenous to levels of private investment.
8. Conclusion
There are a number of mechanisms which might aid
governments in committing not to make opportunistic changes in
taxes and regulations once private firms have made irreversible
investments.  One which has received considerable attention
would involve participating in a multilateral investment

values for the tests against the null of no serial correlation were P>0.99.
38 P-values in each case were P>0.99.
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agreement, but there are doubts about both the effectiveness and
the desirability of this solution.  This paper has investigated an
alternative commitment mechanism - checks and balances in
government.  Results are consistent with the proposition that
political institutions characterized by checks and balances allow
governments to credibly commit, but that they are not a necessary
condition for commitment to take place.
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Annex I: results of quantile regressions
˝
. sqreg lninv lninv_1 gdpdiff1 lncredit sdinfl oil coup
vuln exec_con lncheck2,
>  q(25 50 75) reps(100)
---------------------------------------------------
         |              Bootstrap
   lninv |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|
---------+------------------------------------------
q25      |
 lninv_1 |    .945608   .0201261     46.984   0.000
gdpdiff1 |   1.236493   .1756387      7.040   0.000
lncredit |   .0544741   .0164766      3.306   0.001
  sdinfl |  -.0086865   .0044221     -1.964   0.050
     oil |  -.0193615   .0269047     -0.720   0.472
    coup |  -.0313721   .0416613     -0.753   0.452
    vuln |   .0360402   .0259217      1.390   0.165
exec_con |   .0068396   .0267691      0.256   0.798
lncheck2 |   .0280932   .0157065      1.789   0.074
   _cons |  -.1887225   .0558005     -3.382   0.001
---------+-----------------------------------------
q50      |
 lninv_1 |   .9241875   .0168346     54.898   0.000
gdpdiff1 |   .9275581   .2032632      4.563   0.000
˝
lncredit |   .0089257   .0094732      0.942   0.346
  sdinfl |  -.0005471   .0043939     -0.125   0.901
     oil |  -.0034596    .020806     -0.166   0.868
    coup |  -.0276101   .0221988     -1.244   0.214
    vuln |   .0236858   .0233953      1.012   0.312
exec_con |   .0147944   .0137765      1.074   0.283
lncheck2 |   .0204581   .0111328      1.838   0.066
   _cons |   .1317546    .039368      3.347   0.001
---------+----------------------------------------
q75      |
 lninv_1 |   .8725054   .0222126     39.280   0.000
gdpdiff1 |   .7045227   .1752354      4.020   0.000
lncredit |   .0025671   .0145581      0.176   0.860
  sdinfl |   .0029052   .0038699      0.751   0.453
     oil |   .0182165   .0258873      0.704   0.482
    coup |  -.0498239   .0283413     -1.758   0.079
    vuln |   .0057412   .0293681      0.195   0.845
exec_con |  -.0037399   .0146028     -0.256   0.798
lncheck2 |   .0140458   .0154354      0.910   0.363
   _cons |   .4004142   .0562278      7.121   0.000
---------+-------------------------------------------
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. sqreg lninv lninv_1 gdpdiff1 lncredit sdinfl oil coup
vuln exec_con npolcon,
> q(25 50 75) reps(100)
---------------------------------------------------
         |              Bootstrap
   lninv |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|]
---------+-----------------------------------------
q25      |
 lninv_1 |   .9305864    .014584     63.809   0.000
gdpdiff1 |   1.033418   .1574906      6.562   0.000
lncredit |   .0541627   .0158057      3.427   0.001
  sdinfl |  -.0095908   .0049402     -1.941   0.052
     oil |   .0044525   .0219323      0.203   0.839
    coup |  -.0465492    .036295     -1.283   0.200
    vuln |   .0284645   .0244182      1.166   0.244
exec_con |   .0229971   .0270995      0.849   0.396
 npolcon |   .1263281   .0431084      2.930   0.003
   _cons |  -.1533325   .0523529     -2.929   0.003
---------+-----------------------------------------
q50      |
 lninv_1 |   .9244133    .014606     63.290   0.000
gdpdiff1 |   .6463827   .1939714      3.332   0.001
lncredit |   .0086185    .009309      0.926   0.355
  sdinfl |   -.000896   .0050428     -0.178   0.859
     oil |   .0172731   .0184363      0.937   0.349
    coup |   -.017514   .0233542     -0.750   0.453
    vuln |   .0199302   .0190894      1.044   0.297
exec_con |   .0141491   .0142314      0.994   0.320
 npolcon |   .0796622   .0257169      3.098   0.002
   _cons |   .1365434   .0315203      4.332   0.000
---------+-----------------------------------------
q75      |
 lninv_1 |   .8752501   .0191087     45.804   0.000
gdpdiff1 |   .5399975   .1754867      3.077   0.002
lncredit |   .0025334   .0120354      0.210   0.833
  sdinfl |   .0024299   .0040784      0.596   0.551
     oil |   .0225518   .0218651      1.031   0.303
    coup |  -.0470735   .0268033     -1.756   0.079
    vuln |  -.0049083   .0273736     -0.179   0.858
exec_con |  -.0038134   .0139273     -0.274   0.784
 npolcon |   .0194378   .0345812      0.562   0.574
   _cons |   .4010217   .0394757     10.159   0.000

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For presidential systems, check is the sum of 1 for the president and
1 for each legislative chamber.  The value is modified upwards by
1 if an electoral competition index developed by Ferree, Singh, and
Bates is greater than 4 (out of a possible 7).  Also, in closed list
systems where the president’s party is the 1st government party,
then the relevant legislative chambers are not counted.
For parliamentary systems, check is the sum of 1 for the prime
minister and 1 for each party in the governing coalition.  If
elections are based on a closed list system and the prime minister’s
party is the 1st government party, then this sum is reduced by one.
As for presidential systems, the value of check is modified upwards
by 1 if value of the Ferree, Singh, and Bates index for electoral
competition is greater than 4.
